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Abstract 
This paper attempts to combine descriptive and normative approaches tothe study of argu- 
mantation. Starting from the insights of ancient rhetoric and dialectic (Aristotle, Cicero), New 
Rhetoric (Pereiman and Olbrechts-Tyteca), the Pragma-Dialectic framework (Van Eemeren 
and Grootendorst) and the theory of fallacies developed by Woods and Walton, bias is 
defined as a lack of appropriate balance and critical doubt relative to a specific kind of argu- 
mentative discourse. More particularly, two main kinds of bias are distinguishable: global 
and local bias. The former consists in a neglection of global dimensions of the issue in ques- 
tion; the latter esults from an incoraplete and/or incorrect application of argument schemes. 
A sample of about 80 letters to the editor written 1991-1992, where the problem of political 
asylum in Austria and Germany is ~:he central issue, is described and critically evaluated in 
relation to the argument schemes and strategies of verbalization which are used. Two specific 
letters are analyzed in some detail, lZinally, some recommendations concerning the improve- 
ment of both the climate and the standards of political discussions are suggested (e.g. the 
widespread practice of 'semantic fights' with the aim of pushing through one's own use of 
political terms should be replaced b:¢ the use of (more) impartial terms). 
I. Introduction 
The use of empirical methods ~aken from linguistic discourse analysis increasingly 
proves fruitful for the study of argumentation. On the one hand, progress in the 
development of a theory of everyday argumentation is not possible without a 
detailed knowledge of the processes and structures of argumentation i  natural an- 
guage; on the other hand such knowledge is indispensable for well-founded analyses 
of argumentative discourse. Ful~:hermore, the success of empirical research can be 
demonstrated through the possibility of practical application. The results of empiri- 
cal studies can be used, for example, to identify problems in everyday instances of 
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political argumentation a d to suggest practical solutions. In our paper, we attempt 
to serve both descriptive and normative interests in the study of argumentation, 
much in the spirit of Van Eemeren et al. (1993), who study various types of argu- 
mentative discourse in less than ideal circumstances in order to enhance both the 
theory and the practice of argumentation. As empirical data, we have collected a 
sample of about 80 letters to the editor in German and Austrian journals and maga- 
zines of the years 1991-92. The central issue of these letters is the problem of polit- 
ical asylum. The sources of all passages quoted below can be found in the Appendix. 
A proper discursive treatment of political issues is often hampered by the fact that 
the respective opponents only use those fragmentary aspects of complex issues 
which support their case. Therefore, it is difficult to judge the relevance of their 
arguments for the global issue. In this way, frequently an antagonistic polarization of 
the debate rather than a consensus on adequate policies is achieved. The problem of 
bias in political argumentation is discussed in Kindt (1992b), where debates about 
the Gulf War are used as examples. In this paper, we are going to deal with the prob- 
lem of bias in some more detail. As we cannot deal with all aspects of political argu- 
mentation within the limits of this paper, we would like to present answers to the fol- 
lowing three questions: 
(1) Which global aspects of the problem are treated and which are left out (= global 
bias)? 
Global bias is to be detected and criticized at the macro-level of the text (sections, 
chapters), that is, as far as the unbalanced treatment or complete neglect of global 
dimensions of the problem under discussion is concerned. 
(2) Which argument schemes are used to treat more specific aspects of the problem? 
Are the schemes used in a simplistic and one-sided way (= local bias)? 
Local bias is to be analyzed at the micro-level of the text (sentences, paragraphs), 
that is, as far as the insufficient elaboration of specific arguments within a larger tex- 
tual unit is concerned. 
(3) How can we explain the increasingly aggressive climate of political discussion? 
The treatment of our empirical data in Section 2 and 3 is intended to answer the first 
two of these questions. In Section 4, we shall sum up the descriptive results, give 
some answers to question (3) and finally try to formulate some recommendations to 
overcome the shortcomings of the political debate in Austria and Germany. 
For our analysis, we have tried to integrate insights from various frameworks. 
First of all, ancient and modern rhetorical traditions provide attempts at classifying 
(everyday) arguments as instances of argument schemes. These schemes were called 
topoi~loci by Aristotle (1959, 1960) and Cicero (1951) within the Topical tradition of 
ancient rhetoric and dialectic, whereas they were termed 'techniques of argumenta- 
tion' by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971) in their New Rhetoric. 
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Moreover, we adopt the general strategy of the Pragma-Dialectic approach of Van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 1992, 1994), who want to reconcile descriptive 
and normative approaches in the study of argumentation (cf. also Kienpointner, 
1996). They have developed a code of conduct for rational discussants and study 
everyday arguments as partial, more or less adequate realizations of these normative 
rules. Furthermore, they have foimulated critical questions for testing the acceptabil- 
ity of instances or argument schemes found in everyday arguments. We also use the 
many elucidatory studies by Weods and Walton on fallacious arguments (e.g. Wal- 
ton, 1992; Woods and Walton, 1989), which are based on perspectives of both for- 
mal and informal ogic (cf. also Blair, 1992). In particular, Walton (1991) provides a 
useful background for the analysis of bias in political discourse. Walton lists five 
characteristics of bias in order of importance: 
"1. Bias is a lack of appropriate balance or neutrality in argumentation. The problem here is that an 
arguer supports one side too strongly and/or too often. 
2. Bias is a lack of appropriate critical doubt in argumentation. The problem here is a failure of 
restraint and/or failure to suspect the natural inclination to push for a point of view one supports. 
3. Bias is a lack of balance or critical doubt appropriate for a given type of dialogue that a participant 
is supposed tobe engaged in. It is aot merely a lack of balance, but a lack of sufficient balance for 
a particular type of dialogue. 
4. Bias is often identified with a particular position supported by an arguer. 
5. Bias is often identified with an ar~uer's having something togain - a personal interest in the out- 
come of an argument, e.g. a financial interest." (Walton, 1991: 19) 
We add some remarks on the first three characteristics, which are considered the 
most important by Walton. The first characteristic makes intelligible the intuitive 
impression that biased arguments lack an impartial treatment of both sides of a ques- 
tion. However, a strong suppox~: of one particular point of view need not be inher- 
ently fallacious. Therefore, Walton adds the second characteristic, which makes 
clear that bias is also connected with a specific weakness on the part of the speaker 
as far as a self-critical distance in relation to his or her own point of view is con- 
cerned. The third characteristic adds the important qualification that bias always has 
to be judged relative to a certain type of argumentative discourse. Of course, it 
makes no sense to look for impartiality in quarrels (eristic dialogues) or bargains 
(dialogues of negotiation); and letters to the editor cannot be criticized in the same 
way as scientific argumentation. In the following, we attempt o critically view the 
arguments in our sample according to standards which do justice to this particular 
type of argumentative t xt. Th~Lt is, we judge particular arguments relative to stan- 
dards which are actually followed in many other letters of our sample. Therefore, we 
criticize weaknesses of argumentation only if they are not found in all letters of our 
sample. 
Bias is not restricted to eve~Tyday argumentation. It can also occur in scientific 
argumentation, especially where problems like political asylum are concerned, 
where everybody can be expected to have his or her own strong political convictions 
and commitments. So we have 1:o deal with the problem of how we can avoid bias in 
our treatment of political argumentation. A first step towards the solution of this 
problem is to be aware of one's own point of view and to make it explicit. In this 
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way, we can try to avoid an unjustified and exaggerated criticism of points of view 
and arguments which are opposed to our own opinion. Moreover, instead of hiding 
eventual bias in our analysis behind a pretended 'objective' perspective, we make it 
possible for the critical reader to judge whether or not we have succeeded in analyz- 
ing the texts of our sample as impartially as possible. 
So what are our own political commitments? We are opposed to any kind of mod- 
erate or radical racism. As far as political refugees are concerned, we support a more 
liberal policy which does not accept he current severe restrictions for asylum-seek- 
ers. The protection of human rights for political refugees takes priority over eco- 
nomic interests. 
2. Theoretical background 
2.1. Kinds o f  bias 
Like most discursive texts, political discourse in its monological form follows the 
general pattern of a three-part structure: introduction, main part and conclusion. 
Similar distinctions can be found in modem discourse analysis (cf. Henne and 
Rehbock, 1982: 186ff., 226ff.) and ancient rhetoric (Aristotle, 1959: 174f.; Cicero, 
1951: 2.79ff.). In the case of our letters on political asylum, the main part can very 
often be further divided according to the following prototypical structure: the status 
quo of society is described and evaluated as a negative situation which has to be 
overcome. Next, a more desirable state of society is outlined as a positive goal which 
should be attained in the future. Then, some possible political measures for reaching 
this goal are suggested. The conclusion following the main part usually contains an 
appeal which calls for action according to the policy advocated in the main part. 
This structure partially corresponds to an argument scheme called 'pragmatic 
argument' by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971: 266ff.; cf. below Section 2.3). 
Given the limited space in letters to the editor, pragmatic arguments quite often 
appear in a reduced form. The same holds true of other instances of argument 
schemes appearing in the main part. This should not be criticized as local bias unless 
an argument clearly deviates from standards of preciseness and plausibility reached 
in many other letters. In this case, the following criticism is justified: "The suspicion 
in the case of an arguer who is badly biased is that the accused is not judging the 
worth of an argument according to the requirements of the argumentation scheme, 
but always reaching the conclusion, instead, that happens to support he point of 
view chosen in advance" (Walton, 1991: 3). 
Apart from local bias, there is also the danger of global bias. The latter is the 
result of a neglection of global aspects or dimensions in the controversial issue. In 
our sample, three global aspects of the problem can be distinguished according to the 
temporal dimension: the discursive treatment of past, present or future aspects of the 
problem of political asylum. 
Statements oriented towards the past offer causes, reasons and explanations for the 
negatively evaluated status quo. For instance, one reader writes: 
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(1) Die Str6mungen yon Emigranten und Asylbewerbern sind mittelbare und 
unmittelbare Folge der friiheren europiiischen Kolonialpolitik. 
'The flood of emigrants and asylum-seekers is an indirect and direct conse- 
quence of the former European colonial policy.' 
A discussion orientated towards the past should provide prerequisites for answer- 
ing the following question: wha~ and how much should the persons involved con- 
tribute to a solution of the problems of the negatively evalutated status quo? The 
underlying logical context often remains implicit and can be described as follows: if 
certain persons are (jointly) responsible for a negative situation, they can be asked to 
contribute to the solution of the problems involved. 
Discussions oriented towards ff~e present time are characterized by statements which 
qualify the status quo in some detail. These qualifications, too, should be justified by 
suitable arguments. An example of such statements is the following passage: 
(2) lm iibrigen zeigt die Zahl der Anerkennungen, daft etwa 98 Prozent der Asyl- 
bewerber nicht politisch Verfolgte, sondern Wirtschaftsfliichtlinge sind. 
'Besides, the number of persons accepted as asylum-seekers indicates that about 
98% are not political refugees, but economic migrants.' 
Argumentation rientated towards the future offers statements about he adequacy 
of measures and tries to justify them whith arguments for subsequent policies. In the 
following example, a reader opposes possible constitutional mendments: 
(3) Jeder weiJ3, daft wir den Einwanderer-Zustrom bremsen miissen. £)afiir miiflte 
das 'Asylverfahrensgesetz' ~usreichen. Die Durchsetzung dieses Gesetzes ist 
wichtiger als eine Zerfledderung des Grundgesetzes mit Einzelheiten. 
'Everyone knows that we have to slow down the influx of immigrants. The asy- 
lum laws should suffice for that. The efficient execution of this law is more 
important than the demolition of the constitution through details.' 
Similarly, the textbooks desclSbing and regulating debate tournaments at U.S. aca- 
demic institutions distinguish global subjects ('stock issues') which have to be dealt 
with by the competing teams (cf. Freeley, 1986: 55ff.). However, in academic debate 
it is obligatory to treat all subjects in an equally detailed and sophisticated way. 
The distinction of the three global dimensions i  helpful for the explication of 
implicit argumentative sequence,;. It is also useful for the classification ofpassages as 
instances of argument schemes which are typical of the respective global subject. We 
will analyze specific schemes of argumentation in Section 2.3. But first, it is useful to 
provide a more general classification of the different ways of justifying a statement. 
2.2. Procedures of justification 
The efforts made by particip~tnts in discussions to justify their own statements or
to refute those of their opponents can differ widely (cf. Kindt, 1992a). For the sake 
of simplicity, we will only discuss procedures of justification. 
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A statement can be asserted without further justification, if it is trivially evident on 
the basis of an intersubjectively given perception, or if it is unanimously accepted 
within a speech community. In example (3) the expression Jeder weifl ('everyone 
knows') is used to allege unanimous acceptance of the statement. 
Another type of justification is the argument of authority (cf. Aristotle, 1959: 
127f.; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971: 305ff.). According to this type of jus- 
tification a statement is valid beyond reasonable doubt if it is confirmed by a quali- 
tatively or quantitatively relevant group of persons with a great deal of competence 
in the respective area. Writers of letters to the editor can claim a status of authority 
if they are contemporary witnesses of certain events or have professional knowledge. 
Here are two examples: 
(4) Ich selber habe die Geschehnisse w6hrend er Nazidiktatur im Dritten Reich 
miterlebt und bin deshalb der Meinung, daft der Grundgesetzartikel auf keinen 
Fall gedndert oder abgeschafft werden dapf 
'I myself was witness to the events that took place during the Nazi dictatorship 
in the Third Reich; therefore, I believe that the article of the constitution must 
not be changed or abolished in any way.' 
(5) Wie traurig ist das rapide Zuriickweichen der Sozialdemokraten, auf die bisher 
Verlafl schien, vor den Gegnern des Asylrechts fiir politisch Verfolgte. Als 
Richter fiihle ich mich zur Kritik daran berufen, besonders oweit es um die 
Rolle der Gerichte in den neuen 'ldeen' geht. 
'The rapid retreat of the social democrats, who have seemed so reliable thus far, 
is very regrettable! As a judge, I feel I am the right person to criticize this, espe- 
cially as far as the role of the courts with reference to the new 'ideas' is con- 
cemed.' 
Apart from the speaker, other persons or institutions are often appealed to as 
authorities. In the following example, both individual and institutional authorities are 
used: 
(6) Der Bonner Korrespondent der Neuen WestfMischen weist in seinem Kommen- 
tar dankenswerterweise darauf hin, daft es hierzulande "einen harten Kern von 
Rechtsradikalen gibt', der keinen besonderen Anlaj3 braucht, um Jagd auf Aus- 
ldnder zu machen, daft aber auch in den K6pfen anscheinend braver 
Biirger(innen) fremdenfeindliches Gedankengut schlummert. Diese deprimie- 
rende Tatsache wird zwar nach wie vor von den meisten Politikern und auch 
Journalisten geleugnet, wurde aber bereits vor mehr als zehn Jahren durch die 
yon der damaligen sozial-liberalen Bundesregierung in Auftrag gegebene 
SINUS-Studie offenbar. 
'In his commentary, the correspondent of the Neue Westf~ilische newspaper in 
Bonn laudibly refers to the fact that there is "a hard core of right wing radicals" 
in this country, who do not need a special excuse for hounding foreigners, but 
also that xenophobic ideas lie dormant in the heads of seemingly honest citizens 
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as well. This depressing fact is still not acknowledged by the majority of the 
politicians and journalists, but was already clearly demonstrated more than 10 
years ago by a SINUS report commissioned by the then social-liberal federal 
government.' 
Another procedure of justification tries to support a point of view inductively, 
with the help of suitable examples and illustrations (Aristotle, 1959: 127; 1960: 
303; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971: 350). This procedure is used in the fol- 
lowing passage: 
(7) Tatsache aber ist, daft die weitaus meisten Fliichtlinge im ersten Halbjahr 1991 
aus Ldndern kamen, in denen schwerwiegende Menschenrechtsverletzungen 
begangen werden oder in aenen blutiger Biirgerkrieg herrscht: Jugoslawien, 
Rumfinien, Ostanatolien, lra,~, Libanon ... 
'It is a fact that in the first half of 1991 the vast majority of refugees came from 
countries where human rights are severely violated or where bloody civil wars 
are taking place: Yugoslavia, Romania, East-Anatolia, Iran, Lebanon .... ' 
Finally, another, particularly important procedure is to justify a point of view by 
premisses and inference rules, because in this way - at least in principle - deductive 
proof of the controversial point cf view can be established. In the following example 
this technique is used for the reftttation of a claim about he xenophobia of Germans. 
More specifically, the inference rule of contraposition (modus tollens) is applied: 
(8) Was heiflt eigentlich, die Deutschen haben grundsgitzlich einen Ausliinderhafl, 
wie man behauptet ? Das Wort 'Auslginderhafl' miiflte bei diesen Hassern aus- 
getauscht werden dutch das Wort: 'AsylantenhaJ3'. Diese - meiner Meinung 
nach gesteuerten - autonomen Jugendlichen gehen doch zu 90 Prozent in die 
iSrtlichen 'Auslginderlokale' zum Essen t Warum ? Weil sie einen Haft auf 'Aus- 
lginder' haben ? Das kann nicht sein ... 
'What does it mean that Germans have an inherent hatred of foreigners, as is 
maintained? The expression 'xenophobia', if applied to these people who are 
full of hate, should be replac,ed by the expression: 'hate of asylum-seekers'. 90% 
of these autonomous young people - who are in my opinion manipulated - reg- 
ularly go to local 'foreigner restaurants'! Why? Because they hate 'foreigners'? 
That can't be the case ...' 
The logical structure of this argument can be reconstructed approximately as fol- 
lows: 
If all Germans were xenophobic, German young people would not go to restaurants 
of foreigners. 
90% of German young people go to restaurants of foreigners. 
Therefore: not all Germans are xenophobic. 
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The last procedure of justification is of vital importance in our analysis in the fol- 
lowing sections. The reconstruction f discursive procedures underlying everyday 
arguments, however, is complicated by the fact that they are usually presented in a 
highly implicit form. An in-depth analysis and a critical evaluation are only possible 
if the various underlying logical structures are well known. Therefore, we need 
detailed typologies of argument schemes underlying everyday arguments like those 
in our sample. 
2.3. Argument schemes 
If the logical structure of argument schemes remains largely implicit in everyday 
arguments and mutual understanding in discursive dialogues i nevertheless possible, 
the meaning and use of these schemes must be highly conventionalized and form a 
stable part of the tacit knowledge of a speech community. Therefore, one of the main 
aims of empirical discourse studies is to identify the underlying logical structures 
and ways of realization of these schemes. In the following, we shall present argu- 
ment schemes frequently found in our sample and illustrate their realization in dis- 
course with some examples. In Section 3, we shall analyze two letters in more detail. 
Many of the schemes we are going to examine can already be found in the Aris- 
totelian catalogues of topoi (1960 passim, 1959:119ft.). The way Aristotle presents 
the topoi in his Rhetoric and his Topics varies considerably. Still, it is possible to 
isolate two main functions: the selective function (hence the name of topos as a 
'place' where arguments can be found) and the guarantee function. According to the 
first function, topoi are search strategies which enable the speaker to choose relevant 
arguments from the set of all possible arguments. The latter function allows an equa- 
tion of Aristotelian topoi with inference warrants in the sense of Toulmin (1958): 
they guarantee the plausibility of the transition from the premisses to the conclusion 
(cf. De Pater, 1965; Green-Pedersen, 1984). In modem typologies, further empiri- 
cally recognizable argument schemes have been added (e.g. by Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971). Moreover, many authors have tried to develop clear crite- 
ria for the demarcation of these schemes and formulated sets of critical questions as 
to their validity and plausibility (cf. Schellens, 1985; Van Eemeren and Kruiger, 
1987; Warnick and Kline, 1992; Kienpointner, 1992a,b; 1993; Kindt, 1992a,b; 
Garssen, 1994). 
We have distinguished three global dimensions in the asylum issue, which are 
treated more or less extensively in our sample (cf. above, Section 2.1): past, present, 
and future. Arguments oriented towards the past try to explain the present state of 
affairs. Therefore, many schemes deal with the causes and reasons of the criticized 
status quo. Some causal schemes (cf. already Aristotle, 1959: 132ff.) have the fol- 
lowing structure: 
If event Y would not have happened without event X, X is the cause of Y. 
Actually, Y would not have occurred without X. 
Therefore: X has been the cause of Y. 
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The following example is an application of this counterfactual way of reasoning, 
which is used to criticize political lethargy as the cause of the uprise of totalitarian 
regimes: 
(9) Das, was wiihrend des Dritten Reiches an B6sem geschehen ist - die Velfolgung 
Andersdenkender, Krieg, millionenfache Vernichtung menschlichen Lebens - 
wfire meines Erachtens ni(ht eingetreten, wenn bereits 1933 bei vielen der 
damaligen Zeitzeugen ich~ Gleuchgiiltigkeit, Wegsehen, Weghgren, Zuriick- 
ziehen ins Private vorgeherJscht hdtten. 
'The evil things that occulted during the Third Reich - the persecution of 
opposers of the regime, war, the execution of millions of human beings - in my 
opinion would never have happened, if many of those who witnessed what was 
going on already in 1933 had not been so indifferent, had not looked away, had 
paid attention and not withdrawn into their own private world.' 
Another variant of causal schemes uses abductive inferences (cf. Peirce, 1973): if 
event Y is entailed by X, then X is at least a possible cause of Y. This inference rule 
is applied in [10]: 
(10) Mit Waffen auch aus deutscher Produktion wird ein Groflteil der Fliichtlinge 
aus ihrer Heimat gebombt - und wir wundern uns dann, wenn sie vor unserer 
Tiir stehen und unseren ScJ)utz erbitten. 
'A majority of the refugees has been bombed out of their native land with 
weapons partially producecl in Germany - and then we are surprised when they 
turn up at our doorstep and ask for our protection.' 
Another kind of causal reasoning tries to refute abductive inferences (cf. Aristotle, 
1960: 132f.): the assumption of a causal relationship between X and Y is attacked 
by the presentation of the 'real' reason of Y, namely Z. In the following example this 
attack is combined with the charge that the 'real' cause has been concealed: 
(11) Minderheiten werden benutzt, wenn es darum geht, Defizite in unserer 
Gesellschaft zu verschleieJm. Dann heiflt es z.B., die Ursache fiir die grofle 
Arbeitslosigkeit, fiir die steigende Kriminalitgit oder fiir die wachsende 
Unsicherheit auf den Straflen seien die Auslginder. 
'Minorities are used to conceal deplorable states of affairs in our society: for 
instance, it is claimed that the high rate of unemployment, the rising crime fig- 
ures, and the growing insecurity in our streets are caused by the foreigners.' 
If effects are caused by intentionally acting persons, the following question arises: 
did these persons freely choose to act (or to refrain from acting) in a particular way 
or were they forced to? In the first case, they are responsible for any negative con- 
sequences and have to justify their acts. Thus a speech act sequence 'reproach-justi- 
fication' is opened (cf. Kindt, 1992b). In the following passage, the author of the let- 
ter emphatically tries to justify a certain group of persons (namely, the children of 
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refugees), arguing that they are not responsible for the negatively evaluated status 
quo: 
(12) lch sehe Kinder vor mir, kleine Ji'iShliche Wesen, die sich yon anderen Kindern 
auf dieser Welt kein biflchen unterscheiden. Die sind nicht gefragt worden, ob 
sic in Deutschland in einem Container oder Asylantenheim wohnen m6chten, 
ob sic ihre Kindheit in beengten Verhgiltnissen, gehaflt von Menschen, die sic 
gar nicht kennen, verbringen miSchten. Diese Kinder haben nun wirklich nichts 
mit Arbeitslosigkeit, Wohnungsnot usw. zu tun ... 
'! see children, happy little creatures, who are not at all different from other 
children in this world. They have not been asked if they would prefer to live in 
Germany in a container or an asylum-seeker's hostel, if they would like to 
spend their childhood in cramped conditions, hated by people they do not even 
know. These children really have nothing to do with unemployment, housing 
shortage tc . . . .  
A contrary position is taken in the following letter, where the asylum-seekers are 
seen as being responsible for the existing problems: 
(13) Tatsache ist, daft die Mehrheit der zu uns kommenden Menschen nicht aus 
Griinden politischer Verfolgung, sondern aus rein wirtschafilichen Erwgigun- 
gen hierher kommt und sich unter lnanspruchnahme unserer sozialen Einrich- 
tungen ein besseres Leben erhofft. 
'It is a fact that the majority of the people who come to our country do not 
arrive because they are politically persecuted, but out of financial reasons, and 
that they hope for a better life with the help of our social institutions.' 
Arguments oriented towards the present ime often try to define or classify (ele- 
ments of) the status quo or to compare it with similar situations and problems. 
Therefore, argument schemes containing definitions, part-whole or species-genus 
relationships are used. 
Schemes containing definitions (cf. Aristotle, 1959: 126; 1960: 561ff.) often try 
to define an entity X by a definition Y in a way which makes certain conclusions 
favoring one's own position possible. In the following passage the author criticizes 
this strategy: 
(14) Sprache ist verr~iterisch: Die der spiiten Achtziger und der jetzt Neunziger ist 
es auth. Klingt Asylant nicht ein wenig wie Strauchdieb ? ... So werden aus 
'Rabauken' pl#tzlich 'Ordnungstrupps verunsicherter Biirger' (O-Ton von 
einem Lokalpolitiker in Hoyerswerda), zusammengehauene Opfer mutieren 
pauschal zu Sozialhilfebetriigern). 
'Language is very revealing: that of the late eighties, now the nineties, is, too. 
Doesn't 'asylum-seeker' equate a little bit with 'tramp'? ... Thus 'hooligans' 
become 'vigilante squads consisting of unnerved citizens' (these are the words 
of a local politician in Hoyerswerda), ~beaten-up victims' universally turn into 
'social welfare swindlers'.' 
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Schemes containing part-whole or species-genus relationships (cf. Aristotle, 
1959: 128; 1960: 421ff.; Kienpointner, 1993) are used for inferences of subsump- 
tion and classification: properties of parts or species are transferred tothe whole or 
genus and vice versa. For instance, the relative importance of entities can be demon- 
strated by their inclusion as part X into a whole Y. In the following example, the 
importance of the number of refugees in Germany is shown to be insignificant, 
because the refugees form only a very small part of the population of Germany: 
(15) Tatsache ist auch, daft siimtliche bei uns lebenden Fliichtlinge, ob anerkannt 
oder noch im VeJfahren, weit weniger als 1% der BevOlkerung der Bundes- 
republik ausmachen. 
'It is also a fact that all refugees living in our country, whether already accepted 
or still under consideration, represent far less than 1% of the total population of 
the Federal Republic.' 
Schemes of comparison rely on similarities or differences of entities (cf. Aristotle, 
1959: 123; 1960: 371 f f.). An irnportant variant of these schemes contains an infer- 
ence rule which is called 'rule o~f justice' by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971: 
218ff.). According to this rule, entities X and Y which are identical or similar 
according to a criterion Z, have 1:o be evaluated and/or treated in the same way. The 
following example applies this appeal for justice: 
(16) Jeder ausffindische Arbeitsnehmer zahlt, genauso wie jeder deutsche, Sozial- 
versicherungen, Steuern und nicht zu vergessen den Solidarit~itsbeitrag, der 
Dank dafiir ist Ausffinderfe,;ndlichkeit. 
'Exactly like every German worker, every foreign worker has to pay social 
security contributions, taxe,; and last but not least he solidarity contribution, all 
they get for this is xenophebia.' 
A strategy counteracting appeals to the rule of justice tries to point out more or 
less important differences between the compared entities. If entities X and Y, instead 
of being identical or similar, differ according to a criterion Z, the application of the 
rule of justice is blocked; see the following example, where the writer tries to 
demonstrate that Germany is different from other countries as to size and, therefore, 
is not able to let in many refugees: 
(17) Das verhgiltnism6flig kleine Deutschland ist eben nicht Kanada oder Australien. 
'Germany, which is relatively small, cannot be compared to Canada or Aus- 
tralia.' 
An important variant of the schemes of comparison is the 'a fortiori'-scheme 
(called topos of more/less or 'locus a maiore/a minore' in the ancient radition, cf. 
Aristotle, 1959: 124f.; 1960: 407ff.; Cicero, 1951: 2.172; Perelman and Olbrecht~- 
Tyteca, 1971 : 343). A general version of the 'a minore'-scheme could be formulated 
as a norm of action (cf. another version concerning the relative probability of states 
of affairs in Kienpointner, 1992b: 183): 
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If even X has property P, and Y's having P is more acceptable than X's having P, 
then Y should have P. 
(Even) X has P. 
Therefore: Y should have P. 
Within the context of the refugee problem in Austria and Germany, this type of argu- 
ment can be used to criticize a restrictive policy, because even poorer countries 
accept more refugees; however, it can also be applied to justify a restrictive policy, 
because ven richer countries have adopted strategies for reducing the rate of immi- 
gration. This is shown by the following two examples: 
(18) lm krisengeschiittelten U garn miissen seit den letzten Monaten viermal so viel 
Fliichtlinge versorgt werden, als unser 'sozialer' Minister Liischnak fiir ein 
Jahr zu kontingentieren gedenkt. 
'In crisis-ridden Hungary, for the last few months four times as many refugees 
have had to be provided for than our 'social' minister L6schnak plans to accept 
in one year.' 
(19) Selbst die USA, eines der reichsten Lginder, haben schon vor .lahren den 
Zustrorn yon Einwanderern drastisch reduziert. 
'Even the USA, one of the richest countries in the world, already reduced the 
influx of immigrants drastically ears ago.' 
Causal arguments oriented towards the future are quite often instances of the 
scheme of argumentation which has been called 'pragmatic argument' by Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971: 266ff.; cf. also Aristotle, 1959: 129; Toulmin et al., 
1984: 369ff.; Freeley, 1986:18 lff.). According to this scheme, the evaluation of an 
action X depends on the positive or negative consequences Y of X. In its two basic 
versions, this can be presented as follows: 
Action X leads to consequence Y. 
Y is desirable. 
There are no other actions Z with even 
more desirable consequences. 
X has no or few negative ffects. 
Action X leads to consequence Y. 
Y is undesirable. 
There are no other actions Z with even 
more negative ffects. 
X has no or few positive effects. 
Therefore: X should be done. Therefore: X should not be done. 
Most of the time, actions have both positive and negative consequences. Therefore, 
all consequences should be considered and weighed up against each other. Action 
X can only be justified if the positive consequences outweigh the negative ones 
qualitatively and/or quantitatively. Likewise, X can only be rejected if its negative 
effects are not outweighed by the positive ones (cf. Kindt, 1992b). As it is often 
difficult to consider all the direct and indirect consequences of an action and not 
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neglect at least some of them, the danger of local bias in pragmatic arguments i
considerably high. 
In the following two examples, special emphasis is placed on the qualitatively 
most important consequences (2t3) and on possible indirect consequences (21): 
(20) Wenn man zul?iflt, daft auch nur eines diesel" Rechte auf dem Jahrmarkt 
deutscher Eitelkeiten verschachert oder gal" der Gewalt der Strafle geopfert 
wird, bringt man die Freiheitsrechte insgesamt in Gefahr. ... Die Opferung 
auch nur eines Grundrecl~ts liefle das Gespenst von Weimar wieder iiber 
Deutschlands Straflen und Pliitze schleichen. 
'If even one of these rights is permitted to be sold off at the German vanity 
fair, or sacrificed because of the street terror, the rights of freedom as a 
whole are endangered . . . .  Even the sacrifice of only one constitutional right 
would again let the specter of Weimar creep into the streets and squares of 
Germany...' 
(21) Wer damit begint, Menschengruppen aus dem gerichtlichen Rechtsschutz her- 
auszunehmen, schafft damit gephrliche Einbruchstellen fiir die spgitere 
Entrechtung immer weiterer Personenkreise. 
'Whoever starts to remove social groups from the protection of the courts, 
creates dangerous weak points where ever more persons can be deprived of 
their rights.' 
We have now presented an overview of types of everyday arguments occurring 
frequently in our sample. Of course, these types are only one step in the justification 
or refutation of a controversial point of view. They have their place in a sequence of 
complex argumentation where arguments are related directly or indirectly to the 
main issue of the discussion. Moreover, their verbalization is accompanied bystrate- 
gies of foregrounding or backgrounding of relevant information. We will turn to 
these strategies in the next section. 
2.4. Strategic distribution of information 
Participants in a discussion can touch on themes they do not treat explicitly by 
giving partial information which requires ome reading between the lines (cf. Van 
Dijk, 1992; 1993: 3If.; Gruber, 1993). For this purpose, they often use the follow- 
ing three strategies: selection of suitable lexical means of expression, background- 
ing of incomplete information, foregrounding of incomplete information. 
The first strategy consists in the choice of words which provide (e.g. with the help 
of conversational implicatures in the sense of Grice (1975)) information about a 
theme not treated explicitly. In the following example, the primary theme is the 
alleged inconsistency of the asylum policy of the FDP (= the German Liberal Party). 
Politicians of the FDP are accused of not practising what they preach (cf. Aristote- 
les, 1959: 132): 
(22) Neben den komfortablen Bungalows aller FDP-Bundestagsabgeordneter sollte 
man Unterkiinfie fiir Afrikaner, Asiaten und Zigeuner einrichten. Die liberalen 
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Damen und Herren wiiren dann wohl sehr schnell vom Mitleid fiir die armen 
'politisch Vetfolgten' geheilt. 
'Accommodations for Africans, Asians and gypsies hould be built next to the 
comfortable bungalows of all FDP-members of the Bundestag [-- the Lower 
house of the German parliament, M.K./W.K.]. These liberal ladies and gen- 
tlemen would quickly be cured of their pity for the poor 'victims of political 
persecution'.' 
The writer of this letter, G. Bittner, explicitly criticizes the behavior of members of 
the FDP; but by choosing the lexical item arm (= poor) and using quotation marks 
('victims of ...') he also implies - possibly ironically - that the refugees are not 
really victims of political persecution and that they are possibly the main cause of 
the negatively evaluated status quo. 
With the help of the second strategy, the writer explicitly introduces the side 
theme, but refrains from expanding it in the following discourse. Thus, it is back- 
grounded. In the following letter, political measures uggested by the then German 
minister of the interior, Sch~iuble, are criticized: 
(23) Kennt Schgiuble die M6glichkeiten des Asyh,elfahrensgesetzes nicht oder will 
er nicht dariiber sprechen - aus ganz anderen Griinden, die mit der Bew61ti- 
gung der Asylantenflut gar nichts zu tun habe ? 
'Doesn't Sch~iuble know the asylum laws or doesn't he want to talk about hem 
- for entirely different reasons, which have nothing to do with the influx of 
asylum seekers?' 
The parenthetical comment about personal motivations on the part of the minister are 
not taken up in the following context. It is only at the end of the letter that the writer 
provides ome further information which implies that Sch~iuble suggested changes of 
the constitutional laws in order to annoy the SPD (= the German Social Democratic 
Party). 
The third strategy places explicit information on themes which in the main part 
are not treated at the beginning or the end of the letter. Thus in a letter which mainly 
analyzes the present status quo, possible causes are only presented at the end. The 
prominent position of the last sentence in the published version of the text fore- 
grounds this causal explanation: 
(24) Solange aber junge Leute nicht heiraten ki~nnen, weil sic keine bezahlbare 
Wohnung finden, solange alleinerziehende Miitter aus gleichem Grund in Not- 
unterkiinfte abgeschoben werden, solange der letzte deutsche Kleinstrentner 
under der Armutsgrenze l bt, solange hat der Biirger ein Recht auf Angst und 
Sorgen, denn unsere 'vom Volk gewgihlten Politiker' sitzen in Bonn und reden, 
reden und reden! 
'However, as long as young people cannot get married because they can't find 
an affordable apartment, as long as single mothers are pushed away into tem- 
porary accommodation, as long as there is one German retiree living below the 
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poverty line, the citizen has a right to be afraid and worried, because our 
'politicians elected by the people' are sitting in Bonn and only keep on talking, 
talking, talking !)' 
On the one hand, these strategies can reduce the danger of bias because they 
provide implicit or explicit information on side themes not covered in the rest of the 
letter. On the other hand, they often have the function of transporting positions and 
judgments without giving explicit arguments which could be attacked and refuted. 
For instance, in example (24) a reproach is verbalized, but not justified. Thus the 
readers could more easily be influenced by a potentially biased statement. 
3. Detailed analysis of two letters to the editor 
We chose the two letters analyzed in this section in detail according to the fol- 
lowing criteria: 
(a) They should cover a broad range of themes, that is, they should not be restricted 
to isolated cases or events. 
(b) They should not be too short, which would automatically entail some kind of 
global bias, that is, the neglect of important global dimensions of the problem 
under discussion; nor should they be too long, because that would make a 
detailed analysis impossible within the limits of this paper. 
(c) They should be examples of everyday argumentation. Therefore, we chose letters 
of ordinary people who are not dealing with asylum problems professionally. 
(d) They should represent contrary points of view, namely a rather liberal and a 
rather estrictive position concerning refugee policy. 
Following these criteria, we chose the letter Straffiillige miissen abgeschoben wer- 
den ('Criminals have to be deported'), written by 'Andreas Kr~imer, GieBen (in 
Frankfurter Rundschau, 16.10.1991; henceforth abbreviated as L1), and the letter 
Nur eine kleine Hilfe ('Only a i~ittle help') by Uwe Ttinnermann, Lemgo (in Neue 
Westfiilische, 24.9.1991; henceforth abbreviated as L2). The full texts and transla- 
tions are given in the Appendix, Section A2. 
In our analysis we will not refrain from giving critical comments on the argumen- 
tation of the authors. However, we are not going to criticize them for deviations from 
high standards of scientific argumentation. Walton (1991: 4ff.)justly remarks that 
every argument can only be jud~:ed as biased relative to a type of argumentative con- 
text. Letters to the editors are ~aot intended as scientific inquiries into a problem. 
Moreover, the writers do not have enough space to treat a problem exhaustively. 
Besides, quite often the editors of the journal or magazine reserve the right to omit 
parts of the letter. This is exactly what seems to have happened with two passages of 
L2. But still, it is justifiable to criticize arguments in letters to the editor if they are 
globally or locally biased in comparison to many other letters in the sample, that is, 
according to standards of argumentation which seem to be followed frequently in 
this type of argumentative disco~4rse. Moreover, authors of letters to the editors often 
explicitly claim that they (are trying to) argue objectively or impartially (cf. our 
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analysis of L 1 and L2 below). Especially these passages can be criticized if they do 
not follow standards of critical discussion like, for example, those established by 
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 1992). If the authors themselves claim a 
reputable standard of argumentation, they cannot be excused in the same way as the 
writers of other letters who use their text simply as a means of political polemics or 
propaganda or want to compensate for strong emotional tensions. Finally, we would 
like to repeat (cf. Section 1) that we do not claim absolute objectivity in this case and 
only try to analyze the letters as impartially as possible. 
In the following, we first present he argumentative macrostructure (cf. Van Dijk 
and Kintsch, 1983: 15) of L1 and L2. This reconstruction of the basic propositions 
conveyed by the texts will be used as a starting point for critical comments on 
possible global bias. 
According to the macrostructure d picted in Fig. 1, L1 can be characterized as a 
text which mainly gives reasons for the deplored status quo and suggests measures for 
improving the situation. Kr~imer almost completely refrains from analyzing the pre- 
sent situation. Differently from many other letters in the sample, Kr~imer does not try 
to define crucial concepts nor to classify or compare the status quo (using relation- 
ships of species-genus orpart-whole or similarities and differences). Especially prob- 
lems of justice, which are treated in many letters of comparable length, are almost 
entirely neglected. Therefore, L1 's almost exclusive orientation towards the past and 
the future can be criticized as a global bias. However, L 1 is a reaction to an earlier 
article Rechtsextremismus weir verbreitet (Attitudes of the extreme right are wide- 
spread) in Frankfurter Rundschau (26.9.1991). The analysis of the status quo in this 
earlier article seems to be included implicitly. In our detailed analysis of L1, we will 
have to consider whether the abstention from an explicit treatment of the present sit- 
uation is dysfunctional so for the claims concerning possible reasons and measures. 
The macrostructure of L2 can be reconstructed asin Fig. 2. As can clearly be seen, 
Ttinnermann treats all global dimensions of the problem. However, the focus of his 
treatment is clearly directed towards the present and the past situation. Measures 
suggested for the future are not compared with the possible alternatives or evaluated 
as to negative consequences. The negative consequences xpected by Kr~imer are 
apparently not a central issue for Tiinnermann. Therefore, also L2 can be criticized 
as globally biased: it is too strongly orientated towards an analysis of past reasons 
for the status quo and questions of justice in the present situation. 
In our detailed analysis of L1, we shall mainly be dealing with three problems: 
(1) How are the schemes of argumentation verbalized? 
(2) Which strategies of foregrounding or backgrounding are used? 
(3) Which local forms of bias and/or other forms of uncorrect or fallacious argu- 
mentation can be detected? 
3.1. Analysis of L l  
3.1.1. Verbal strategies 
Strategies of verbalization are used to make one's own arguments as strong as 
possible. They can be used to reject possible objections to one's own arguments 
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Analysis of the past 
Cause 1 : 
Demanding attitude of 
the foreigners 
ir 
Determination of the 
:auses of the negative 
image of foreigners/ 
asylum-seekers among 
the German population 
Cause 2 I 
Criminal foreigners set 
at large 
Cause 3: 
Neglect of the German 
culture 
Measures for improving the critici~',ed status quo 
Measure 1 : 
Acceptance of the call 
for deportation 
If measure 1 is not 
carried out: loss of 
the guarantee of asy- 
lum granted by the 
constitution 
Measure 2: 
Not to turn Germany into 
a country of immigrants 
If measure 2 is not 
carried out: reappear- 
ance of Nazi slogans 
like "(German) peo- 
ple without room" 
Measure 3: 
Improvement of the 
image of foreigners 
If measure 3 is carried 
out: rescue of art. 16 
of the German consti- 
tution 
Fig. 1 
(defensive strategies) or to produce the impression that one's own arguments are 
(almost) evident proof (offensiw', strategies). 
An example of  a defensive strategy is the opening sentence of Kr~imer's letter: So 
entsetzlich die Vorkommnisse ... sind ( 'However terrible the events ... are'); this is 
an instance of the strategy called 'concessio'  (concession) in ancient rhetoric (cf. 
Quintilian, 1970: 500; Van Dijk, 1993: 93ff.). This rhetorical strategy consists in 
conceding a weak argument in order not to have to defend it in detail. Then the 
speaker goes on to argue in favor of  a stronger point of  view. Kr~imer concedes that 
the violent attacks on asylum-seekers' hostels are dreadful in order to prevent the 
impression that he would play down these events. The latter could not be justified in 
a democratic society. 
Similarly, with the formulation So ist es keinesfalls 'rechtsextrem' ( ' It is, there- 
fore, in no way an 'attitude of the extreme right') '  in the third paragraph e wants to 
prevent his urgent recommendat!ion f  the deportation of  refugees from being evalu- 
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Present situation 
Classification: I / 
Germany belongs to the 
rich industrial nations 
Placing the asylum 
problem into its proper 
context 
I 
Comparison: 
The number of refugees 
in Germany is relatively 
small 
\ 
Political dimension: 
A large part of the 
German population 
considers the asylum- 
seekers as a burden 
for the GNP 
Analysis of the past 
Reason 1 of the status 
quo: Exploitation of 
the Third World by 
the unfair terms of 
trade 
Reason 2: 
Contributions by the 
industrial nations to 
the existence of total- 
itarian regimes in the 
Third World 
Reason 3: 
Indirect consequence 
of former European 
colonialism 
Measures 
Measure l : 
Acceptance of further 
asylum-seekers 
Justification: 
Morally required con- 
tribution to interna- 
tional aid 
Measure 2: 
No pressure on the 
refugees as to the 
expression of grati- 
tude 
Justification 1: 
Refugees are not 
responsible for their 
situation 1 Justification 2: Aid for asylum-seek- ers is part of a com- pensation required by standards of justice 
Fig. 2 
ated negat ively as a right wing extremist 's  point of view. Prevent ive strategies are 
called 'p raemuni t io '  (preventive defense) in ancient rhetoric (cf. Quint i l ian 1970: 
485). This technique is also used in the immediate ly  fo l lowing defense of this mea- 
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sure: Dies sollte ... nicht so einj'ach ... abgetan werden ('This should not simply be 
dismissed'). At the same time, Kr~imer's continuous attempts at dissociating himself 
from positions of the extreme right are used as strategic means of positive self-pre- 
sentation (cf. Van Dijk, 1992; 1993: 76ff.). 
Offensive strategies try to present one's own arguments as maximally relevant 
and/or conclusive. To reach this aim, Kr~imer presents the global focus of his argu- 
mentation, namely, the negative; image of the asylum-seekers, as maximally perti- 
nent to the asylum discussion. According to his formulation in the first paragraph, it
is inevitable to think about he low degree of acceptance of the refugees (... so kom- 
men wir nicht umhin, dariiber r,'achzudenken ... 'we cannot avoid considering ...'). 
In the second paragraph, e considers the demanding attitude of the foreigners as one 
reason for their negative image This argument is presented as trivially true: So ist 
doch letztlich unbestritten ... ('After all, it cannot be denied ...'). However, this for- 
mulation is mildly mitigated by the particles doch letztlich ('after all'). 
Another offensive strategy consists in presenting the own point of view as relevant 
for all or the vast majority. This strategy is realized by the use of the 'inclusive we': 
for example; Kramer uses wir in this at the end of the third paragraph: Wir riskieren 
... zu verlieren ('We risk losing ...'). 
3.1.2. Distribution of information 
As we have seen above, part of the information conveyed by the text is quite often 
backgrounded. The backgrounded information can trigger inferences which the 
reader is supposed to make. However, a more explicit presentation of the inferences 
could be detrimental to the position of the author. Thus, backgrounding information 
serves a double purpose. 
In the second paragraph of k 1, Kramer, using a parenthesis (- aus dessert Sicht - 
'according to his view'), restricts the claim about he demanding attitude of the for- 
eigners to Mr. Average (Otto Normalverbraucher, literally: 'Otto Average Con- 
sumer'). However, by simply u,;ing the name and a parenthesis, Kr~imer backgrounds 
this restriction. It is only a secondary theme, the importance of which is thereby 
reduced. Compare other possible formulations like 'Of course, the demanding atti- 
tude exists only in the mind or Mr. Average', which would express the restriction 
with much more informative weight. In this way, Kr~imer can admit that his argu- 
ment is not tenable for all Gerraans without having to withdraw it completely. 
In the third paragraph, the use of the expression Zauberwort ('magic word') cre- 
ates an implicature which connects the right of asylum with the influx of (criminal) 
desperate people: magic word,; like 'asylum' create an impression of a paradise in 
Germany, which attracts innumerable people without hope. Again, Kr~imer could not 
have claimed this implicature xplicitly without weakening his own arguments: after 
the violent attacks on refugee~,; it has become difficult to claim that Germany is a 
magic kingdom for asylum-seekers. 
The last sentence of L1 calls for active participation by the foreigners in Kramer's 
program in creating a better in~age for the refugees (Hierzu bedarf es aber auch der 
Mitwirkung der Ausffinder). Kr~imer leaves possible ways of participation implicit. 
In this way, it is easier for the readers of L1 to share Kr~imer's point of view because 
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an explicit mentioning of possible measures could include kinds of policies not 
acceptable for many of them. 
3.1.3. Schemes of argumentation 
The quality of the arguments in a text can be evaluated in two steps: firstly, they 
can be criticized as locally biased arguments because they are incomplete instances 
of an argument scheme. This is the case when relevant premisses are left out, for 
example important causes or consequences. 
Secondly, they can be criticized as incorrect applications of an argument scheme 
because they create misunderstandings due to the use of ambiguous expressions or 
contain hasty generalizations or falsely present emporal succession as causal rela- 
tionships or are connected with unjustified personal attacks (cf. Van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst, 1992). 
We will begin with an evaluation of the completeness of the argumentation. At the 
beginning of L1, Kr~imer uses causal arguments. These can be criticized as incom- 
plete because Kr~imer does not discuss or at least mention further possible causes for 
the negative image of foreigners, for example: 
(a) insufficient strategies by the politicians, 
(b) deeply rooted prejudices against foreigners, 
(c) persuasion by emotionalizing propaganda directed against foreigners, 
(d) insufficient information about he situation in the developing countries and the 
individual and collective fate of asylum-seekers before their arrival in Germany. 
Without consideration of these causes, which are treated explicitly in many other 
letters in our sample, Kramer's analysis necessarily remains incomplete. He could at 
least have stated that there are further possible causes for the negative image. Thus, 
the omission of further causes cannot be simply ascribed to the lack of space within 
a particular text type like letters to the editor. Furthermore, the local bias resulting 
from the neglect of other possible causes of the status quo also reduces the plausi- 
bility of the measures suggested by Kr~imer later on. 
Of course, Kramer's concentration measures to improve the image of foreign- 
ers could be justified if he did not want to suggest an overall solution of the problem. 
However, the opening sentence in the last paragraph of his letter creates the impres- 
sion that the improvement of the image would be the main step towards a solution 
(Das Ziel zur Rettung des Artikels 16 GG muff sein, wieder eine breite Akzeptanz in 
der Bev6lkerung zu schaffen. 'In order to save article 16 of the constitution [= which 
grants the right of asylum, M.K./W.K.], one needs to recreate broad foreigner accep- 
tance by the population'). Moreover, even if Kramer only wanted to provide a par- 
tial solution to the problem, he could have strengthened the relevance of his sugges- 
tions by comparing the number of foreigners with the total population of Germany 
or by giving data concerning the number of criminal foreigners in proportion to 
criminal German citizens. 
Finally, further measures, which are treated repeatedly in other letters, are simply 
missing in Kr~imer's discussion of possible policies: 
(a) a better explanation of the asylum laws by the politicans; 
(b) job opportunities oreven obligatory work for asylum-seekers, 
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(c) reduction of the welfare contributions for the refugees to the necessary mini- 
mum. 
As far as the correctness of the arguments in LI are concerned, we have to distin- 
guish three aspects: 
(a) The sincerity of Kramer's personal statements cannot be judged by looking at 
the text alone. Moreover, often it is not easy to tell how we have to interpret 
statements which are not explicitly marked as subjective. Therefore, in these 
cases a judgment of correctness i  not possible. 
(b) Most statements in L1 are formulated as if they were accepted by all or most 
members of the German speech community. Again, it would be very difficult o 
judge the correctness of these assumptions. It would be particularly difficult to 
decide whether the alleged facts really are the (only) causes of the negative 
image of foreigners. 
(c) Therefore, within the limits of a textual analysis, a more feasible way of analy- 
sis is the critical assessment of the correctness of the inferences drawn by 
Kr~imer. The truth and the sincerity of the statements used as premisses are 
accepted provisionally. 
This does not mean that the facts presupposed by Kr~imer are uncontroversial. In 
the first paragraph of L1, he asks why in der nahezu gesamten deutschen 
BevOlkerung die Akzeptanz gege~Tiiber Auslgindern/Asylbewerbern ... gering ist. This 
presupposes that almost all Germans have a negative view of foreigners. However, 
the title of the article in the Frankfurter Rundschau which Kr~imer quotes only says 
that right wing extremism is widespread (Rechtsextremismus verbreitet). Kramer's 
presupposition could be criticized as an instance of the fallacy of hasty generaliza- 
tion. However, this generalizatien is necessary for his further arguments. Only if the 
vast majority of the population really has a negative attitude towards foreigners, can 
Kr~imer's conclusions be justified: he considers the improvement of the negative 
image as the main problem to be solved. 
The correctness of Kr~imer's inferences suffers particularly from the fact that he 
does not sufficiently distinguish between foreigners in general and asylum-seekers. 
In the passage quoted above he treats foreigners and asylum-seekers a  one group 
(Ausliinder/Asylbewerber). In the second paragraph e talks about foreigners (Aus- 
lander), but seems to have asylum-seekers and economic migrants in mind. In the 
third paragraph he mentions foreign drug dealers, gamblers, thieves and gangs (aus- 
liindische Drogendealer, Hiitchenspieler, Diebes- und Unterweltbanden), which can- 
not be equated with political refugees in the sense of § 16 of the constitution, which 
grants asylum. But this is exactly what Kramer does when he falsely claims that 
many of the respective criminals are attracted to Germany by the magic word 'asy- 
lum' (das Zauberwort 'Asyl'). Therefore, even if this statement is true about the 
criminals referred to, it cannot be used to infer the conclusion concerning the depor- 
tation of criminal asylum-seekers. Due to the ambiguity of crucial terms used by 
Kr~imer, the logical relationship between his premisses and his conclusion remains 
unclear and his interence is, therefore, not correct. 
Kr~imer's loppy use of Aus/ginder could be justified because he talks about the 
political views and emotions of the German citizens, who do not carefully distin- 
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guish different senses of the word either. This is the way in which the negative 
image of specific groups of criminal foreigners is transferred to the refugees. How- 
ever, any discussion about possible political measures to improve the situation 
should avoid confusing clearly different groups. Writers of other letters in our sam- 
ple, differently from L1, do attempt o distinguish 'foreigners' in general from 
'refugees', asylum-seekers' and 'economic migrants'. 
Twice, Kr~imer uses instances of the pragmatic argument (cf. Section 2.3.) to jus- 
tify political measures through the negative consequences which will follow if the 
measures are not realized. 
In the third paragraph, e justifies his call for deportation with undesirable conse- 
quences for the negatively evaluated status quo. His inference, which proceeds in 
three steps, can be reconstructed asfollows (for the sake of brevity, we only provide 
the warrants, that is, the inference rules justifying the step from the premisses to the 
conclusions): 
(1) If the deportation of criminal foreigners is not undertaken, the negative image of 
asylum-seekers will remain unchanged. This inference rule remains implicit, but 
has been justified by Kr~imer in the preceding context. Therefore, the rule, which 
is necessary for the correctness of the inference, can be supplemented. However, 
as we have shown above, this inference rests on a premise ('Criminal foreigners 
cause the negative image of asylum-seekers') which confuses different groups of 
foreigners. 
(2) If the negative image of the refugees remains unchanged, § 16 can no longer be 
carried out. This step is explicitly stated by Kr~mer (cf. Jedes Recht kann nur 
solange durchgesetzt werden, wie es ... trifft). 
(3) If §16 can no longer be carried out, it runs the risk of being abolished. Again, 
this inference rule remains implicit. But Kramer can correctly suppose that his 
readers know the rule, given the many recent requests for the abolition of § 16 
from the constitution. 
All in all, Kr~mer's argumentation seems to be a correct application of the prag- 
matic argument scheme. However, as we have seen, some premisses of the inference 
are problematic due to an ambiguity of crucial terms. Moreover, the presupposed 
causal relationship between the foreigners' negative image and the abolition of §16 
remains doubtful because some further possible causes are not considered. 
Kr~mer uses a second instance for the pragmatic argument in the fourth para- 
graph. This time, he argues by pointing out negative consequences if certain politi- 
cal measures are taken: If Germany is made an immigration country through certain 
legal measures, right wing theories of Volk ohne Raum (= Hitler's claim: 'Germans 
do not have enough space to live') can be expected to be revived. 
Kr~imer also seems to imply that further negative consequences would go hand in 
hand with these extremist theories. However, he himself does not seem to consider 
this argument to be sufficient because he adds an argument of comparison: Germany 
is considerably smaller than traditional immigration countries. But again, his use of 
the pragmatic argument seems to be basically correct. Still, he can be criticized for 
not discussing possible advantages of a more liberal immigration policy, which 
could outweigh negative effects, like the creation of dubious theories by small 
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groups of the extreme right. To a certain extent, this incompleteness makes Kramer's 
argument biased. Moreover, his way of warning about he danger of right wing reac- 
tions can be accused of being a kind of concealed racist strategy: this way, restric- 
tive measures can be justified at any time as the lesser of two evils (cf. Van Dijk, 
1993: 99ff.). 
To sum up, we conclude that our detailed analysis of L1 has shown a number of 
weaknesses. The plausibility of Kr~imer's arguments i reduced by two main factors: 
the incompleteness of some of its arguments make L1 locally biased, the correctness 
of the inferences in LI is partially endangered by the ambiguity of crucial terms. 
3.2. Analysis of L2 
In our treatment of L2, we shall deal with our three basic questions imultane- 
ously. We recall that the questic,ns are: (1) the verbalization of arguments, (2) the 
informational strategies, (3) the plausibility of the arguments. Ttinnermann's letter 
has apparently been shortened by the editors of the Neue Westfiilische in three 
places. However, this seems to be relevant for our discussion of possible local bias 
only in one instance, namely, at the end of the letter. 
In the first two paragraphs of L2, Tfinnermann uses a technique called 'dissocia- 
tion of concepts' by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971:411 ft.). In its most gen- 
eral form, it consists in refuting a position by pointing out that it relies on 'appear- 
ance' rather than 'reality' (ibid.: 415). 
In the first paragraph, Tiinnennann contrasts the position based on stereotypes of
the mass and mass media ('appearance') with expert knowledge about he status quo 
('reality') mentioned in the second paragraph. He points out his reserve against such 
stereotyped attitudes by using quotation marks and the subjunctive (als stiinde 
Deutschland in der 'Asylantenfr6'ge' vor einem (lberlebensproblem. 'The impression 
that Germany is facing problem~'~ of survival because of the 'asylum-seekers' ques- 
tion')'. Moreover, the use of the lexical item Uberlebensproblem (problem of sur- 
vival) can be analyzed as a backgrounded criticism. That is, Tiinnermann implicitly 
criticizes exaggerated claims in the asylum discussion: quite often, causal 'argu- 
ments of direction' (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971: 281ff.) are used to sup- 
port the view that a liberal asyl~,m-policy ultimately leads to a catastrophe. His use 
of the form Bundesbiirger(innen) (male and female citizens of the Federal Republic) 
makes clear that Ttinnermann is also opposed to sexist norms of usage. At the same 
time, he indirectly introduces himself as someone who knows more than the average 
citizen. 
In the second paragraph, Ttinnermann tries to prove that the facts refute the stereo- 
type of an apparently disastrous :~tatus quo. To do this, he uses two arguments; First, 
he classifies Germany as a rich industrial nation. Possible counter-arguments against 
this instance of a species-genus argument scheme are preventively blocked by the 
qualifications trotz ihrer immensen finanziellen Verpflichtungen ('despite its 
immense financial commitments') and nach wie vor ('notwithstanding the economic 
changes in Germany'). Ttinnennann's argumentation can be criticized because it 
does not provide comparisons with the relative wealth and financial problems of 
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other 'rich industrial nations'. Moreover, it falsely pretends that 'rich industrial 
nation' is a precise, clear-cut category. Therefore, it is not compelling to conclude 
that a rich industrial nation cannot have problems of survival. 
Secondly, Ttinnermann presents tatistical evidence which puts the absolute num- 
ber of refugees in Germany into perspective: 1% of all refugees in the world does 
not seem to be much. Moreover, he quotes Amnesty International s a reliable 
source of the data, thereby using an argument from authority (cf. above Section 2.2). 
The following argument is an instance of the a fortiori-scheme (cf. above 2.3): if 
even developing countries have to cope with many more asylum-seekers, Germany 
should not worry about 1% of them. Both arguments suffer from incompleteness 
because TiJnnermann does not present data concerning other industrial nations and 
does not mention the huge problems caused by the influx of refugees into neighbor- 
ing Third World countries. 
The lack of a precise demarcation of crucial concepts and the incompleteness of 
Tiinnermann's argumentation in the second paragraph justifies a criticism of local 
bias. Tiinnermann cannot simply be excused by a lack of space; for instance, in 
many other letters of comparable ngth the financial situation of Germany is dealt 
with explicitly and compared with that of other indistrial nations. 
In the third paragraph of L2, Ttinnermann treats a further central aspect of the asy- 
lum discussion: even if there is no doubt as to the survival of Germany, he has to 
deal with the fact that many German citizens cannot understand why they have to 
bear the costs incurred by the refugees. The strong emotions involved are only hinted 
at by the lexical items wurmt andfleiflig: many Germans are annoyed because part 
of their money, which they have worked hard for, in used for the refugees. However, 
Ttinnermann does not deal explicitly with the emotional problems of these groups of 
the German population, he rather tries to refute their assumed cost-benefit reason- 
ing, which can be reconstructed as follows: 
If we pay for the refugees without getting anything in return, this situation is not 
acceptable. 
We pay for the refugees without getting anything in return. 
Therefore: This situation is not acceptable. 
Ttinnermann criticizes this way of reasoning with the following general type of 
objection: relevant premisses have been left out; hence, the argument is incomplete, 
which means that it is locally biased (cf. Kindt, 1992a: 114). 
Tiinnermann offers three factual claims to show that his criticism is justified. All 
claims try to demonstrate hat Germany shares some responsibility for the eco- 
nomic and historical facts which have led to the asylum-problems. Like Kramer, he 
uses the 'inclusive we' to make the emotional impact of his charge stronger. The 
same function is fulfilled by the negatively connotated nouns Ausbeutung/ 
Produktionsdiktate/Kolonialpolitik (exploitation, constraints of production, colonial- 
ism). Tiinnermann mitigates his accusation by claiming only co-responsibility for 
Germany. Still, a more balanced view should have considered the considerable 
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involvement of local rulers and politicians in the exploitation of people in Third 
World countries. 
In the last paragraph, Tiinnerraann draws conclusions which are wholly based on 
variants of the rule of justice (cf. above, Section 2.3.): 
(a) every nation has to contribule an adequate amount towards international id, 
(b) the countries who have more should help those countries who have less, 
(c) the Germans, at least partially, have to compensate for their profits due to the 
unfair terms of trade with their financial aid. 
Tiinnermann has provided some background for these arguments in the preceding 
paragraphs: he has argued that Germany's contribution to international id is not 
unreasonably high (second paragraph) and that there are economic and historical rea- 
sons which compel Germany to compensate its (earlier) profits made in the Third 
World. Therefore, his application of the rule of justifice is basically correct. 
Arguments based on the rule of justice have to show the equivalence of the com- 
pared things, persons, situations etc., however. Given the fact that many refugees 
come from the former Eastern Bloc, the rule of justice does not apply here, at least 
not in the same way as in the case of refugees coming from the Third World. More- 
over, again using the 'inclusive we', Tiinnermann does not even try to distinguish 
between different degrees of responsibility of subgroups of the German population 
(e.g. owners of big enterprises in contrast to the mass of the population). These dif- 
ferences hould have resulted in a less apodictic use of this argument scheme. 
Finally, it can be criticized that Tiinnermann justifies possible measures for 
improving the status quo only by using moral arguments. That is, he does not con- 
sider the possible consequences of the suggested measures nor does he mention the 
possibility of removing possible causes of the deplored status quo. In general, the 
arguments offered by Tiinnermann suffer from the fact that he does not try to com- 
bine his remarkable ethical standards with an analysis of advantages and disadvan- 
tages of possible measures and their alternatives. 
To sum up, we can conclude the following: though we are more sympathetic to
the position defended by Tiinnermann, L2, like LI, contains everal flaws and weak- 
nesses of argumentation. While Kr~imer's LI is strongly centered round the feelings 
of the German people and pragmatic arguments about consequences of possible 
measures, Tiinnermann's L2 deals mainly with Germany's moral obligations and 
arguments based on the rule of justice. Both letters often lack appropriate balance. 
They are undoubtedly biased to a certain degree. While it may have been impossible 
for them to deal with every aspect with sufficient sophistication, Kr'mner and Tiin- 
nermann could at least have mitigated their claims a little. 
4. Conclusion 
We have tried to present a framework for the analysis of argumentation which 
combines theoretical nd empirical approaches. We have studied the problem of bias 
in political argumentation  the basis of a sample of letters to the editor. Of course, 
the limited space makes it difficult for the writers of these letters not to produce 
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locally or globally biased arguments. However, the analysis of other types of politi- 
cal discourse clearly shows that bias is a general problem in political discussions (cf. 
Kienpointner, 1992a: 250ff.; Kindt, 1992b; Walton, 1991 on bias in oral and writ- 
ten discourse in newspaper articles, TV-discussions, election campaigns etc.). In the 
following, we will list a few possible xplanations for the fact that bias is so frequent 
in political argumentation: 
(a) it is cognitively simple and emotionally more pleasant o recognize only those 
aspects of a problem which are important to oneself and support one's own point 
of view. In this way, cognitive dissonance and unpleasant feelings of shame and 
guilt are avoided or at least reduced. 
(b) Prevailing styles of education and communication i  our culture enhance antag- 
onistic rather than cooperative procedures in the solution of conflicts. The result- 
ing competitive styles of argumentation are prone to produce biased arguments. 
(c) Many social and political problems are so complex that an adequate treatment is
almost impossible on the basis of everyday argumentation. 
An approach like ours, which is directed at descriptive and normative goals, should 
provide strategies and recommendations for overcoming the problems posed by the 
factors listed above. What, then, are viable solutions for improving the quality of 
political argumentation? 
First of all, it has to be stated that it is neither possible nor necessary that political 
argumentation in its everyday form has to treat every aspect of the respective prob- 
lems in a detailed way; some degree of global bias is inevitable, given the various 
limits of time and space. This inevitable bias has to be compensated for by appro- 
priate political structures which grant pluralism and free expression of political opin- 
ions. In democratic societies, the writing of discursive texts, for example ditorials 
or letters to the editor, can be seen as a cumulative process where only the collection 
of all texts written from widely diverging perspectives can be seen as a sufficiently 
balanced treatment of complex political problems: it results in a compensation of
individual bias. Therefore, individual writers like those in our sample may choose 
certain dimensions of the problem and neglect others. But they should become aware 
of the fact that they contribute only partial solutions to the problem. Moreover, they 
should avoid drawing hasty conclusions without qualification. If Kramer and T~in- 
nermann had followed this recommendation, they would have stated that their con- 
centration on pragmatic (L l) or justice-oriented (L2) arguments, respectively, was 
only a contribution towards a partial solution of the complex asylum problem. 
Secondly, bias in political argumentation could be mitigated if people were will- 
ing to avoid the use of crucial political terms with strong positive or negative con- 
notations. Usually, these terms are used because they favor one's own position: if 
somebody is an 'economic migrant' rather than a 'political refugee', he or she does 
not deserve asylum: if somebody is a 'fascist' rather than a 'conservative', his or her 
political arguments need not be taken seriously in a democratic society. Therefore, in 
political debates 'semantic fights' are quite often carried out by participants who 
want to push through their own rules of usage. Many political discussions could 
become more fruitful if the participants were willing to use impartial terms wherever 
available. 
M. Kienpointner, W. Kindt / Journal of Pragmatics 27 (1997) 555-585 581 
Thirdly, the improvement of the standards of political argumentation requires 
institutional changes in our system of education. If people are to become ready to 
produce balanced arguments and to behave cooperatively in discussion, this ability 
has to be formed at school and in other pedagogical institutions. It should be trained 
much more than it is the case n,gwadays, for example in the educational system of 
Austria and Germany. Similar claims hold true for many other countries. It is strange 
to see the following discrepancy: on the one hand, modem societies have become 
completely dependent on successful communication; on the other hand, differently 
from the Ancient World and the Middle Ages, wide-ranging and efficient raining of 
the techniques of argumentation are widely neglected in the educational institutions 
(perhaps with one major exception: the debate tradition in England, the U.S,A., the 
Netherlands and some other co antries). Important political issues like the asylum 
problem often lead to tedious a~d frustrating decision procedures. This makes clear 
that deliberate attempts to improve the practice of argumentation are necessary. 
A change in educational policy is also suggested by the alarming increase of 
nationalism and right wing radicalism in Europe. The brutal attacks on asylum seek- 
ers, foreigners, and gypsies in Austria and Germany call for adequate measures by 
the opinion leaders and politicans. Amongst other measures, the educational policies 
have to be adjusted to oppose racist tendencies of all kinds (cf. Wodak et al., 1990; 
Van Dijk, 1993). Parts of the argumentative competence which should be taught 
(more) are: knowledge about the strength and weaknesses of specific schemes of 
argumentation, the balanced application of these schemes, trategies of verbalization, 
the ability of critical thinking (cf. Paul, 1987), particularly the critical analysis of 
prejudiced thought and its inhuraan consequences. 
Appendix 
A.1. Sources of passages of letters to the editor quoted in Section 2 
(1) Frankfurter Rundschau, 18.10.91; A. Belfellah. 
(2) Neue Westf~ilische, 7.11.91; P. Nipko. 
(3) Frankfurter Rundschau, 26.10.91; H. Wagner. 
(4) Neue Westfiilische, 1./2.11.91 ; F. Martens. 
(5) Frankfurter Rundschau, 10.10.91; K. Beer. 
(6) Neue Westf'zilische, 14.11.91; U. Ttinnermann. 
(7) Frankfurter Rundschau, 9.10.91; A. MUller. 
(8) Neue Westf'~ilische, 19.10.91; G. Arronge. 
(9) Hailer Kreisblatt, 16.10.91; K.-H. Galling. 
(10) Frankfurter Rundschau, 9.10.!)1; A. Miiller. 
(11) Neue Westf'~ilische, 19.10.91; L. Brade. 
(12) Neue WestC~ilische, 19.10.91; W. Brockmeyer. 
(13) Neue Westf'~ilische, 19.10.91 ; K.-M. Hartrampf. 
(14) Neue Westf~ilische, 17.10.91 ; C. Willmann. 
(15) Frankfurter Rundschau, q.10.91; A. Miiller. 
(16) Neue Westf'zilische, 19.10.91; R. Bruzesse. 
(17) Frankfurter Rundschau, 16.10.91; A. Kr~imer (= LI). 
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(18) Profil, 9.12.91; S. Szalachy. 
(19) Neue Westf~ilische, 19.10.91 ; K.-H. Hartrampf. 
(20) Frankfurter Rundschau, 29.10.91; H. Oberst. 
(21) Frankfurter Rundschau, 10.10.91; H. Beer. 
(22) Spiegel, 19.8.91; G. Bittner. 
(23) Frankfurter Rundschau, 26.10.91 ; H. Wagner. 
(24) Neue Westf~ilische, 19.10.91; Ch. Beyer. 
A.2. Full texts and translations c~f the two letters analyzed in Section 3 
LI: Andreas Kr~imer, GieBen: Straffdllige miissen ab~eschoben werden. In: Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 16.10.91: 
So entsetzlich die Vorkommnisse vor dem Auslginderheim in Hoyerswerda sind, so kommen 
wir nieht umhin, dariiber nachzudenken, warum in der nahezu gesamten deutschen Bevi)lke- 
rung. die Akzeptanz gegeniiber Ausldndern/Asylbewerbern so ,Tering ist ('Rechtsextremismus 
verbreitet', FR vom 26.9.). 
So ist doch letztlich unbestritten, da~ nicht wenig Ausliinder mit einer unheimlichen 
Anspruchsmentalitdt nach Deutschland kommen und Dinge verlangen, fiir die Otto Normal- 
verbraucher hart arbeiten muff und die - aus dessert Sicht - iiber die Rettung des an Leib und 
Leben bedrohten hinausgehen. 
Es ist ferner fiir die Masse der Bevdilkerung ein.¢dch unvelwtdndlich, warum etwa auslgindi- 
sche Drogendealer, Hiitehenspieler, Diebes- und Unterweltbanden nach deren Festnahme 
umgehend wieder auf.fi'eien Furl gesetzt werden, anstatt sie abzuschieben. Hier liegt wahrlich 
der Verdacht nahe, daJ3 vieles davon auf das Zauberwort 'Asyl' zuriickzufiihren ist. So ist es 
keines~tlls 'rechtsextrem ', wenn man .[~ndert, daft Asylbewohner ihr Recht veJ~'irkt haben, 
wenn sie es dahingehen (sic. t M.K./W.K.) miflbrauchen, daJ.I sie in dem Land, das sie auf- 
nimmt und yon dessen Steuergroschen ihr Aufenthalt bezahlt wird, straff~illig werden. Dies 
sollte m.E. nicht so ein.fhch als Stammtischgerede abgetan werden. Jedes Recht kann nur 
solange durchgesetzt werden, wie es auf die Akzeptanz der Beviilkerung trifle. Wit" riskieren 
andernfalls das kostbare Asylversprechen des GG g6nzlich zu verlieren. 
So sti~J3t etwa die multikulturelle Gesellscha/[? auf wenif Gegenliebe, wenn man sich des 
Eindrucks nicht el~'ehren kann, daJ3 die eigene Kultur als letztes kommt. In diesem Zusam- 
menhang sei auch davor gewarnt, Deutschland .[~nwTell zu einem Einwanderungsland zu 
machen. Es graut einem schon heute vor den dann zu erwartenden 'Volk ohne Raum'-Theo- 
rien. Das verhdltnismdJ3i~ kleine Deutschland ist eben nicht Kanada oder Australien. 
Das Ziel zur Rettung des Artikels 16 GG muJ3 sein, wieder eine breite Akzeptanz in der 
Bev6lkerung zu schaffen. Hierzu bedalf es aber auch der Mitwirkung der Auslginder. 
'However terrible the events in front of the asylum-seekers" hostel in Hoyerswerda are; we 
cannot avoid thinking about the reasons for the low opinion of foreigners/asylum-seekers 
among almost he entire German population ('Widespread right-wing extremism', FR, 26.9.). 
After all, it cannot be denied that a large number of foreigners come to Germany with an 
unbelievably demanding attitude, asking for things which Mr. Average Consumer has to work 
hard for and which - in his opinion - go above and beyond rescuing life and limb. 
What is more the vast majority of the population cannot understand why foreign drug deal- 
ers, gamblers, thieves and gangs are set free immediately after having been arrested instead 
of being deported. The definite suspicion arises that a lot of this is due to the magic word 
'asylum'. It is, therefore, in no way an 'attitude of the extreme right' if one demands that asy- 
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lum-seekers lose their rights if the) abuse the laws of a country which welcomes them and 
pays for their upkeep with its taxes. In my opinion this should not simply be dismissed as ale- 
house politics. A law only can be enforced as long as it is accepted by the population. Other- 
wise we risk losing completely the precious promise of asylum granted by our constitution. 
Thus a multi-cultural society will not find a great deal of support if one cannot avoid the 
impression that one's own culture is of less importance. In this context I would like to warn 
against formally turning Germany into an immigration country. I already now shudder at the 
thought of the 'A people without enough room' theories which will then be heard. The rela- 
tively small Germany cannot be compared to Canada or Australia. 
In order to save article 16 of the constitution, one needs to create broad foreigner accep- 
tance by the population. However, ~his will only be possible with the help of the foreigners.' 
L2: Uwe Ttinnermann, Lemgo: Nur eine kleine Hil./~,. In: Neue Westf~ilische, 24.9.91: 
Die Bundesbiirger(innen) haben ,;n diesem Sommer wieder einmal den Eindruck. als stiii~de 
Deutschland in der 'Asylantenfrage' vor einem Oberlebensproblem. Es ver qeht kaum ein 
Tag, an dem nicht in den Zeitungen ein Artikel ... zum Thema Asylbewerber erscheint . . . .  
Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist trotz ihrer immensen finanziellen Verpflichtungen 
nach wie vor ein reicher lndustriestaat. Sie hat nach Angaben von Amnesty International 
noch nicht einmal ein Prozent der Weltfliichtlingsmenge bei sich auf~enommen: die meisten 
Asylsuchenden der 'Dritten Welt' .fliehen immer noch in angrenzende Entwicklungsldnder. 
Dennoch wurmt es hierzulande viele, daft diese Menschen aus aller Welt von unserem 
.[TeiJ3i~ erwirtschafteten Bruttosozialprodukt leben. Dabei sollen wir nicht verdr6ngen, daJ3 
wir als Industrienation teilhaben an der Ausbeutung der Rohstoff'e und Arbeitskr6fte der 
'Dritten Welt', deren L~inder wir ~lurch Schutzz6lle, Niedrigpreise, Produktionsdiktate und 
Kreditbedingungen hindern, sich zu entwicklen (sic/ M.K./W.K.). Wir tragen auch iiber 
unsere unsere atlantischen Biindn/sverpflichtungen mit dazu bei, daJ3 in Asien, A fi'ika und 
Lateinamerika undemokratische R gime aus milit6rpolitischen Griinden an der Macht blei- 
ben. Wit sind auch als Europ6er historisch mit hineinvelflochten i die Spdt/[~lgen der 
friiheren abendldndischen Kolonia/politik. 
Wenn wir Asylsuchende bei uns aufnehmen, leisten wir als Staat eigentlich nut unseren 
schuldigen Beitrag zur gemeinsamen i ternationalen Hil[e gegen das Weltfliichtlingselend. 
Wit" sollten deshalb die Asylbewerber nicht st6ndig unter einen Dankbarkeitsdruck setzen, 
denn der einzelne Fliichtling kann nichts dqfiir, daJ3 er im Schatten geboren ist, w6hrend wir 
im Licht leben. Ober die Fliichtlin3;shilfe geben wir den unterentwickelten Lgindern eigentlich 
nut" einen kleinen Tell dessen zurii:'k, was wit ihnen weltwirtschaftlich weggenommen haben 
und militiitpolitisch eute noch wegnehmen . . . .  
'This summer, the citizens of the Federal Republic are once again under the impression that 
Germany is facing problems of survival because of the 'asylum-seekers' question. Almost 
every day articles concerning the issue of the 'asylum-seekers' appear in the newspapers . . . .  
Despite its immense financial c3mmitments, the Federal Republic is still a rich industrial 
nation. According to figures published by Amnesty International, it has not even taken up 1% 
of all refugees in the world; most asylum-seekers in the Third World still flee into neighbor- 
ing developing countries. 
Nevertheless many people living here are annoyed by the fact that these people from all 
over the world are living on our gross national product created by our hard work. However, 
as an industrial nation, we should not forget that we are participating in the exploitation of 
raw materials and manpower in the Third World, whose development is blocked by our pro- 
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tective trade duties, dumping prices, production constraints and credit terms. Moreover, 
through our NATO commitments we are contributing to the fact that undemocratic regimes 
can remain in power in Asia, Africa, and Latin America for reasons of military policy. Fur- 
thermore, as Europeans we are historically involved in the indirect consequences of the for- 
mer European colonial Policy. 
If we take in asylum-seekers, our country is only providing the contribution which it owes 
to joint international id which tries to fight the misery suffered by the world's refugees. 
Therefore, we should not constantly force the refugees to be grateful because the individual 
refugee is not responsible for having been born in the darkness while we live in the light. By 
means of financial aid for the refugees we are only giving back to the underdeveloped coun- 
tries a small part of what we have taken away from them through the global economy and are 
still taking away from them through military policy .... ' 
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